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definite, with a dictum stating that the child can attack, and with
recognizably distinguishable cases possibly indicating that he cannot.
Since this uncertainty is present, was the Supreme Court justified
in upsetting the interpretation of Florida law advanced by the New
York Court of Appeals?60
Johnson v. Muelberger is a further extension of the full-faith-andcredit clause toward prevention of attacks on foreign divorces. The
current policy of the Supreme Court leads in effect to the conclusion
that, if both parties appear in the divorce proceedings, full faith and
credit prevents any attack on the decree by any person in another
state. That such finality of marital status is an admirable conclusion
would probably be admitted by many disinterested persons; but if
this conclusion be based on the law of the state where the divorce
was granted, the Court should impartially ascertain the law of that
state and should not reverse the finding of a court of another state
when its interpretation is not unreasonable. If the ratio decidendi of
the Johnson case is followed, the Supreme Court must in all cases
ascertain the law of the divorcing state and in instances of doubt
resolve the issue in favor of precluding attack, even though this involves overruling an equally sound interpretation to the contrary by
a court of some other state.
WMLTAM

E.

NODInE

LIQUIDATED-DAMAGES CLAUSES IN REAL ESTATE
CONTRACTS
Wrongful invasion of legally recognized personal or property rights
is compensated under our legal system either by a form of specific
relief or by a money judgment for damages. Generally, the remedial
character of the common law contemplated a pecuniary award calculated to compensate for legal wrong.1 Because money is rarely an
accurate substitute for the performance of a contract, however, and
because the damages attending breach are difficult of ascertainment,
COQuery: When the child and the parties to the Florida divorce proceeding
reside outside Florida, how can the child obtain a determination of the Florida
law by the Florida courts?
'See 1 SEGwcx, MEmSurE oF

DA

AGES

§2 (9th ed. 1912).
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contracting parties often attempt to decide in advance the money
value to be assigned to a breach.2 The power of the parties to
"liquidate" damages at the inception of a contract is limited by the
invalidity of clauses designed to forestall breach by imposition of a
penalty. 3 The line between valid liquidated-damages clauses and
penalty clauses is not clear-cut. An analysis of this hazy confluence
of legal theories, with particular reference to the Florida cases, ensues.
HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT

The problem of protecting improvident debtors against exorbitant
payments in the event of default occurred at common law most
frequently in the case of penal bonds, in which the obligor bound
himself to pay a certain sum of money at a fixed date, but with the
proviso that such obligation should become void on the payment of a
lesser sum of money or the performance of a particular act. 4 If the
conditions were not complied with, the penalty was payable and
could be recovered at law without regard to the actual damage
incurred. 5 But equity began to relieve against the oppression caused
by such a practice by permitting the creditor to recover only the actual
damages incurred. 6 Subsequently, legislation provided that in an action upon a bond for a penal sum for the nonperformance of covenants
the plaintiff might assign the breaches of condition and the jury was
thereupon to assess the plaintiff's actual damage. 7 Though the
language of the statute was permissive, it was construed by the courts
to be compulsory.8 The amount named still had the effect, however,
of fixing the maximum limit of recovery in an action on the bond,
although an action on the contract was not so limited. 9
A liquidated-damages clause, as distinct from a penalty clause, was
early upheld in Fletcher v. Dyche,10 on the grounds that the parties
2

See McCoRmIcKc, DAMAGEs §146 (1935).
3Ibid.
4
See McComncK, DAmA Es §147 (1935); 2 SEDcwxcK, MEASURE OF D,AES

§675(b) (9th ed. 1912).

5lbid.
6

See McCoRImcK, DAmAGES §147 (1935).
78 & 9 WM. III, c. 11, §8 (1697).
8Hardy v. Bern, 5 T.R. 636, 101 Eng. Rep. 355 (K.B. 1794); Roles v.
Rosewale, 5 T.R. 38, 101 Eng. Rep. 302 (K.B. 1794); see 2 SGCWICK, MEASURE
OF

DAmArES §675(d) (9th ed. 1912).

9

See Cramp & Co. v. Doughty, 89 NJ.L. 288, 98 At]. 260, 262 (1916).

102 T.R. 32, 100 Eng. Rep. 18 (K.B. 1787).
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were seeking to prevent dispute over the amount of damages and that
a jury would experience considerable difficulty in ascertaining damages. Thus the distinction became entrenched in English law.
The validity of liquidated-damages clauses has been recognized
often in this country.-' Several states have enacted legislation providing that such clauses shall be invalid unless they come within
certain enumerated conditions or exceptions. 12 Similarly, the courts
have set down general principles said to govern the determination of
their validity. The bench has not bound itself by any one principle
but uses all such principles conjunctively in applying them to each
factual situation; and these principles are sufficiently broad to permit
great latitude in their application.
THE

'INTENT" oF

=HE
PARIs

The courts, continuing to act under the theory that eventually led
the English bench to grant relief against penal bonds, have characterized the imposition of liability for a larger sum upon failure to pay a
contract sum as a penalty against which both law and equity will
relieve. 13 Since there is little difficulty in measuring damages for
nonpayment of money, 14 equity will grant relief against a penalty or
forfeiture occasioned thereby.' 5 Likewise, a clause contemplating
primarily security for performance rather than compensation for
breach cannot prevail. 16
11E.g., St. Petersburg Advertising Co. v. American Motorsign Co., 25 F.2d 397
(5th Cir. 1928); Lee v. Clearwater Growers Ass'n, 93 Fla. 214, 111 So. 722
(1927); Southern Menhaden Co. v. How, 71 Fla. 128, 70 So. 1000 (1916);
Allison v. Dunwody, 100 Ga. 51, 28 S.E. 651 (1896); Keefe v. Fairfield, 184
Mass. 334, 68 N.E. 342 (1903); Riling v. Idell, 291 Pa. 472, 140 Ad. 270
Nelson v. Butler, 190 S.V. 811 (Tex. Civ. App. 1917).
(1928);
2
1 CAL. Civ. CoDE §§1670, 1671 (1949); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§214,
215 (1941).
' 3 Goodyear Shoe Mach. Co. v. Selz, Schwab & Co., 157 Ill.
186, 41 N.E.
625 (1894) (law); Maybury v. Spinney-Maybury Co., 122 Me. 422, 120 At.
611 (1923) (equity); Krutz v. Robbins, 12 Wash. 7, 40 Pac. 415 (1895)
(equity); see Kaplan v. Gray, 215 Mass. 269, 273, 102 N.E. 421, 422 (1913)
(law); Kemble v. Farren, 6 Bing. 141, 148, 130 Eng. Rep. 1234, 1237 (C.P.
1829).
14 See, e.g., Potomac Power Co. v. Burchell, 109 Va. 676, 64 S.E.2d 262
(1909).
' 5 Krutz v. Bobbins, 12 Wash. 7, 40 Pac. 415 (1895); see Langever v. B. G.
Smith & Co., 2-78 S.W. 178, 179 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925).
16Watts v. Camors, 115 U.S. 353 (1885); Giesecke v. Cullerton, 280 Ill.
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I Whether a sum named is to be considered as liquidated damages or

penalty is a question of law."7 Aside from the foregoing situations, in
which the rules arei relatively easy of application, prediction of the
judicial attitude is difficult. The intent of the parties is said to be
the controlling factor or guide; 18 and the courts arrive at it by construing the entire contract. 19, Although the languageused to describe
the sum named is one of the factors to be considered in determining
intent, 20 such designation is not conclusive. 21 "Forfeiture"- and
"penalty"23 have been said to import penal intent; and the execution
of a bond conditioned on the performance of a certain act is also
prima facie evidence thereof.2 4 The intent is determined :-as of the
time the contract was entered into, 25 because the phrties in naming a
510, 117 N.E. 777 (1917); Wilkes v. Bierne, 68 W, Va. 82, 69 S.E. 366 (1910);
Aylet7 v. Dodd, 2 Atk. 238, 26 Eng. Rep. 547 (Ch. 1741).
1 Pembroke v., Caudill, 160 Fla. 948, 37 So.2d 588 (.1948); Greenblatt v.
McCall, 67 Fla. 165, 64 So. 748 (1914); Smith v. Newell, f7 Fla.,147,,.20 So.
249IsBarnette
(1896); Langever v. R. C. Smith & Co., 278 S.W. 178 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925).
'v. Sayers, .289 Fed. 567 (D.C. Cir. 1928); Gay Mfg. Co.
v.
Camp, 68 Fed. 67 (4th Cir. 1890); Weatherford v. Adans, 31 Ariz. 187, 251
Pac. 453 (1926); Shields v. Early, 132 Miss. 282, 95 So.'889 (1923); Riehards
v. Edick, 17 Barb, 260 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1858); Dobbs v. Turner, 70 SW. 458
(Tex. Civ. App. 1902). But see Central Trust Co, v. Wo9lf, 255 Mich,,8, 14,
237 N.W. 29, 31 (1931), in which the court stated that intent was of no
practical importance if the sum was in fact (to the court) ii the nature of a
penalty.
19 Sun Printing & Pub. Ass'n v. Moore, 183 U.S. 642 (1901); Shields v.
132 Miss. 282, 95 So. 839 (1923).
Early,
20
Allison v. Dunwody, 100 Ga. 51, 28 S.E. 651 (1896).
21Chicago, B. & Q. Ry. v. Dockery, 195 Fed. 221 (8th Cir. 1912) (liquidated
damages); Weatherford v. Adams, 31 Ariz. 187, 251 Pac. 453 (1926) (forfeit);
Pembroke v. Caudill, 160 Fla. 948, 87 So.2d 538 (1948) (liquidated damages);
Greenblatt v. McCall, 67 Fla. 165, 64 So. 748 (1914) (liquidated damages);
Allison v. Dunwody, 100 Ga. 51, 28 S.E. 651 (1896) (liquidated damages);
Tudor v. Beath, 76 Ind. App. 526, 131 N.E. 848 (1921) (forfeiture as liquidated
damages); Merica v. Burgett, 36 Ind. App. 453, 75 N.E. 1083 (1905) (forfeiture); Richards v. Edick, 17 Barb. 260 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1853) (forfeiture);
Wilkes v. Bierne, 68 W. Va. 82, 69 S.E. 866 (1910) (penalty).
22
Brown-Crummer Co. v. W. M. Rice Constr'n Co., 285 Fed. 673 (5th Cir.
1923); Tudor v. Beath, 76 Ind. App. 526, 131 N.E. 848 (1921); Richards v.
Edick, 17 Barb. 260 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1853); see Weatherford v. Adams, 31 Ariz.
187, 197, 251 Pac. 453, 456 (1926).
23
Wilkes v. Bierne, 68 W. Va. 82, 69 S.E. 866 (1910).
24
Giesecke v. Cullerton, 280 Ill. 510, 117 N.E. 777 (1917).
2
Frick Co. v. Rubel Corp., 62 Fed. 765 (2d Cir. 1933); Blackwood v. Liebke,
87 Ark. 545, 113 S.W. 210 (1908); Seidlitz v. Auerbach, 230 N.Y. 167, 129
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sum as liquidated damages are agreeing upon a binding estimate of
the amount of actual damages in case of breach. Nevertheless, regardless of the judicial lip service paid to this factor of intent, the
determination is in fact objective. The bench employs certain priniples allegedly leading to ascertainment of the "intent"; and this
process in actuality shifts such ascertainment from the subjective level
of reading the minds of the contracting parties to the objective plane
of facts and figures.
TBm RULEs

OF PROPORTION AND OF CERTAINTY

Probably the foremost of the principles governing ascertainment of
intent is that of proportion. This rule, simply stated, is that an amount

payable upon breach, if grossly disproportionate to actual damages
reasonably contemplated, is a penalty,2 6 whereas an amount com-

27
mensurate with actual damages constitutes liquidated damages.
The difficulty is that in many cases the proportion test embraces the

28
damages when they occur rather than when they were anticipated.

This misuse of the rule is completely illogical in view of the theory of

Liquidated damages as a good-faith pre-estimate of the actual damages
occasioned by breach. It is perhaps traceable to the judicial tendency
to employ the doctrine of impossibility of performance to relieve
against a contract that was validly entered into but that has become

oppressive through changed conditions without fault of the obligor.
N.E.26 461 (1920).
Lee v. Clearwater Growers Ass'n, 93 Fla. 214, 111 So. 722 (1927); J. I.
Case Threshing Machine Co. v. Souders, 48 Ind. App. 503, 96 N.E. 177 (1911);
Holt v. Doty, 193 Iowa 582, 187 N.V. 550 (1922). But see Schneider v.
Allis Chalmers Mfg. Co., 196 Wis. 56, 219 N.W. 370, 373 (1928), in which a
sum was held liquidated damages though "such stipulated amount seemed grossly
disproportionate to actual damages."
27
United States v. Bethlehem Steel Co., 205 U.S. 105 (1907); Central Trust
Co. v. Wolf, 255 Mich. 8, 237 N.W. 29 (1931). But the rule of proportion
does not apply, and recovery will be denied, if the vendee, after paying a part
of the purchase price, defaults in further payments and undertakes to recover
payments made while the vendor is free from fault, Miller v. Fletcher Say. &
Trust Co., 78 Ind. App. 183, 183 N.E. 174 (1921).
28
E.g., Axe v. Tolbert, 179 Mich. 556, 146 N.W. 418 (1914); Seidlitz v.
Auerbach, 230 N.Y. 167, 129 N.E. 461 (1920); Riling v. Idell, 291 Pa. 472,
140 At. 270 (1928) (stipulation in realty contract for down payments to be
forfeited as liquidated damages on vendee's breach is binding and limits amount
of recovery even though less than actual damages suffered).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol4/iss2/5

6

Wright: Liquidated Damages Clause in Real Estate Contracts
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW
The judiciary accepts as one indication of liquidated damages the
fact that the probable damages upon breach will not even then be

determinable by a known rule 29 or that they will not then be subject
to computation by an exact pecuniary standard. 30 If they will be

readily measurable upon breach, however, a stipulation of their
amount is regarded as a penalty. 3 1 The reason for this rule may lie
in the impossibility of knowing in advance when the contract will be
breached and hence what the actual damages will be at that time,
even though the method of measuring their amount at any given time
is definite. The values of performance do not stay fixed, and the

parties will not be permitted to pre-estimate them if they can be
determined readily upon breach. This determination is regarded as a
function of the courts rather than of the parties. Though the courts

generally speak of contemplated actual damages or of damages that
29

Frick Co. v. Rubel Corp., 62 Fed. 765 (2d Cir. 1983); Barnette v. Sayers,
289 Fed. 567 (D.C. Cir. 1923) (liquidated-damages clause upheld because
actual damages difficult to ascertain unless plaintiff-vendor could make an early
subsequent sale); Seid Pak Sing v. Barker, 197 Cal. 321, 240 Pac. 765 (1925)
(stipulated sum per acre, to be paid by lessee for failure to perform "any or
all" covenants of lease, held liquidated damages despite statute rendering such
provisions invalid unless actual damages are incapable of ascertainment); Tuten
v. Morgan, 160 Ga. 90, 127 S.E. 143 (1925) (liquidated-damages clause in
realty contract held penalty in view of statute directing this result whenever
actual damages can be definitely computed); Parker-Washington Co. v. Chicago,
267 Ill. 136, 107 N.E. 872 (1915); Ressig v. Waldorf-Astoria Hotel Co., 185
App. Div. 4, 172 N.Y. Supp. 616 (1st Dep't 1926); Sheffield-King Milling Co.
v. Jacobs, 170 Wis. 389, 175 N.W. 796 (1920); see Wilkes v. Bierne, 68 W. Va.
82, 85, 69 S.E. 366, 367 (1910).
30
Wise v. United States, 249 U.S. 861 (1919); Weatherford v. Adams, 31
Ariz. 187, 251 Pac. 453 (1926); Quaile & Co. v. William Kelly Milling Co., 184
Ark. 717, 43 S.W.2d 869 (1931) (in a contract for sale of flour, actual damages
held unascertainable because of frequent fluctuations in price of wheat); Merica
v. Burgett, 36 Ind. App. 458, 75 N.E. 1088 (1905); Board of Educ. v. Broadwell, 117 Okla. 1, 245 Pac. 60 (1926) (statute provided that actual damages
must be unascertainable if stipulated sum to be construed as liquidated damages);
Dobbs v. Turner, 70 S.W. 458 (Tex. Civ. App. 1902).
31
Seid Pak Sing v. Barker, 197 Cal. 321, 240 Pac. 765 (1925) (stipulated
sum, to be paid per acre by lessee for failure to perform one specific covenant
of lease, held penalty under statute because actual damages were easily ascertainable for that particular breach); Giesecke v. Cullerton, 280 IIl. 510, 117
N.E. 777 (1917); Westfall v. Albert, 212 Ill. 68, 72 N.E. 4 (1904); Barber
Asphalt Paving Co. v. St. Paul, 136 Minn. 896, 162 N.W. 470 (1917); Richards
v. Edick, 17 Barb. 260 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1853) (actual damages held capable of
ascertainment upon breach by vendee of realty contract).
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may arise from breach, certainty is adjudged as of the time of actual
breach.
When the subject matter of a contract is the concern of daily
commerce, certainty is normally attainable by reference to an established market. Various situations arise, however, in which ascertainment of damages is more difficult because of the lack of some objective
scale of measurement. Thus damages have been held unascertainable
with sufficient certainty for the following breaches: failure to drill oil
and gas wells within a specified time, 32 to repair a factory,33 to manufacture patented lamp shades under license, 34 to manufacture and sell
certain quantities of flour,3 5 and to carry out the covenants in a lease
of an apartment building.3 6 Conversely, damages have been held
37
sufficiently calculable for failure to return loaned stock as agreed,
to perform a contract for the conditional sale of realty, 38 , and to
carry out covenants to make improvements as specified in a lease.3 9
Many courts state the rule of certainty conjunctively with the rule
of proportion. 40 The two are obviously interdependent in application,

and indeed are perhaps mere aspects of the same principle. The rule
of certainty appears to be a product of the later stage of the common
law, when equity gave relief against bonds to secure the payment of
money. 41 There is, however, no need for the rule of certainty in
addition to the requirement of reasonableness or proportion; the courts
cannot determine whether the sum named is unreasonable or disproportionate 42 without first ascertaining the actual damages with
reasonable certainty. Indeed, many of the decisions expressly adopting the rule of certainty are nevertheless based on the requirement
32
Davidson
33

v. Hughes, 76 Kan. 247, 91 Pac. 913 (1907).
Southem Menhaden Co. v. How, 71 Fla. 128, 70 So. 1000 (1916).
34Kaplan v. Gray, 215 Mass. 269, 102 N.E. 421 (1913).
3
5Sheffield-King Milling Co. v. Jacobs, 170 Wis. 389, 175 N.W. 796 (1920).
The dissenter, however, believed that plaintiff had a duty to mitigate damages
by selling on the market and that his damages for flour already manufactured
should normally be the difference between the contract price and the market
price at which he could have sold.
30
Malone v. Levine, 240 Mich. 222, 215 N.W. 356 (1927).
37
Walker v. Bement, 50 Ind. App. 645, 94 N.E. 839 (1911).
38Lytle v. Scottish-American Mtge. Co., 122 Ga. 458, 50 S.W. 402 (1905);
see Allison v. Coke, 106 Ky. 768, 786, 51 S.W. 593, 598 (1889).
39
Giesecke v. Cullerton, 280 111. 510, 117 N.E. 777 (1917).
40
See note 30 supra.
41

See McCowmscm, DAm - Es §148 (1985).

42Ibid.
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that the sum named be proportionate to the actual damages. 43 There
is no logical reason for invalidating a provision for liquidated damages
merely because the actual damages are readily ascertainable, unless
the stipulated sum is disproportionate thereto. Furthermore, complaint would seldom be raised unless one party thought the preestimated damages disproportionate.
It is recognized that a sum fixed for breach of any one of several
undertakings of varying importance is generally a penalty. 4 4 The
same result follows whenever the contract imposes liability in the
45
same amount regardless of whether the breach is total or partial.

Unless the sum denominated as liquidated damages is staggered in
proportion to the importance of the various breaches, it cannot validly
be applied to those of minor degree.
In the light of the foregoing basic principles, what follows upon

the characterization of the agreed sum as liquidated damages or as
penalty? Of course, if the characterization is upheld the injured
party recovers the amount stipulated, 46 although some jurisdictions
41
require proof of some actual damage as a predicate to any recovery.
43

E.g., Tuten v. Morgan, 160 Ga. 90, 127 S.E. 143 (1925); Dobbs v. Turner,
70 S.W. 458 (Tex. Civ. App. 1902).
44
Chicago, B. &. Q. Ry. v. Dockery, 195 Fed. 221 (8th Cir. 1912); Metz v.
Kennedy Inv. Co., 118 Fla. 708, 160 So. 5 (1935); Holt v. Doty, 193 Iowa 582,
187 N.W. 550 (1922); Gross v. Exeter Machine Works, Inc., 277 Pa. 363, 121
At. 195 (1923); Astley v. Weldon, 2 Bos. & P. 346, 126 Eng. Rep. 1318

(C.P. 1801).
45Brown-Crummer Co. v. W. M. Rice Constr'n Co., 285 Fed. 673 (5th Cir.
1923); Poinsettia Dairy Products, Inc. v. Wessel Co., 123 Fla. 120, 166 So.
306 (1936); Arnold v. First Say. & Trust Co., 104 Fla. 545, 140 So. 660 (1932);
Greenblatt v. McCall, 67 Fla. 165, 64 So. 748 (1914); Horn v. Poindexter, 176
N.C. 620, 97 S.E. 653 (1918); Palestine Ice, Fuel & Gin Co. v. Walter Connally & Co., 148 S.W. 1109 (Tex. Civ. App. 1912); Krutz v. Robbins, 12 Wash.
7, 40 Pac. 415 (1895).
46
Sun Printing & Pub. Ass'n v. Moore, 183 U.S. 642 (1902); Quaile & Co. v.
William Kelly Milling Co., 184 Ark. 717, 43 S.W.2d 369 (1931); Merica v.
Burgett, 36 Ind. App. 453, 75 N.E. 1083 (1905); Sheffield-King Milling Co. v.
Jacobs, 170 Wis. 389, 175 N.W. 796 (1920).
47
Miller v. Macfarlane, 97 Conn. 299, 116 Atl. 335 (1922); Barber Asphalt
Paving Co. v. St. Paul, 136 Minn. 396, 162 N.W. 470 (1917); see Ward v.
Haren, 183 Mo. App. 569, 588, 167 S.W. 1064, 1070 (1914). Contra: Davidson
v. Hughes, 76 Kan. 247, 91 Pac. 913 (1907) (court said some damage was
presumed); see United States v. Bethlehem Steel Co., 205 U.S. 105, 120 (1907);
Blackwood v. Liebke, 87 Ark. 545, 553, 113 S.W. 210, 213 (1908) (no proof
of actual damages required if some positive element of damage was foreseeable
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If, however, the sum is held a penalty the aggrieved party cannot
recover beyond the extent to which he alleges and proves actual
damages.48
Although a liquidated-damages clause is in effect an admission by
the parties that monetary damages are adequate, this concept is disregarded in decrees ordering specific performance of contracts containing such clauses.4 9 The courts will not grant both remedies,
however; 0 and they refuse to decree specific performance if the
provision for liquidated damages is phrased alternatively as permitting
either performance of the contract or nonperformance and payment
of the damages specified. 51
The distinction between a provision for liquidated damages and a
contractual limitation of liability should be noted. The validity of a
limitation is recognized, and only the sum specified as the maximum
52
is recoverable upon breach.
at the time the contract was made); Dobbs v. Turner, 70 S.W. 458, 460 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1902).
48
Watts v. Camors, 115 U.S. 853 (1885); Brown-Crummer Co. v. W. M.
Rice Constr'n Co., 285 Fed. 673 (5th Cir. 1923); Graham v. Lebanon, 240
Pa. 337, 87 Atl. 567 (1913); Palestine Ice, Fuel & Gin Co. v. Walter Connally
& Co., 148 S.W. 1109 (Tex. Civ. App. 1912); see Poinsettia Dairy Products,
Inc. v. Wessel Co., 123 Fla. 120, 128, 166 So. 306, 809 (1936); Arnold v.
First Sav. & Trust Co., 104 Fla. 545, 556, 140 So. 660, 664 (1932); Greenblatt v. McCall, 67 Fla. 165, 169, 64 So. 748, 749 (1914); Smith v. Newell, 37
Fla. 147, 156, 20 So. 249, 252 (1896).
49
Bradsbaw v. Millikin, 173 N.C. 482, 92 S.E. 161 (1917) (negative specific
performance; injunction to enforce covenant not to compete); see OBrien v.
Paulsen, 192 Iowa 1351, 1355, 186 N.W. 440, 442 (1922) (realty contract).
Contra: Martin v. Murphy, 129 Ind. 464, 28 N.E. 1118 (1891) (negative specific
performance); Nelson v. Butler, 190 S.W. 811 (Tex. Civ. App. 1917).
50
Wirth & Hamid Fair Booking, Inc. v. Wirth, 265 N.Y. 214, 192 N.E. 297
(1934).
51
Smith v. Bergengren, 153 Mass. 236, 26 N.E. 690 (1891) (refusing to decree
specific performance of agreement to pay a certain sum upon breach of covenant
not to practice medicine in competition with covenantee); Burgoon v. Johnston,
194 Pa. 61, 45 At]. 65 (1899); Haskins v. Dern, 19 Utah 89, 56 Pac. 953 (1899)
(no specific performance when election to return stock loaned or pay $1.00 per
share therefor); see Bradshaw v. Millikin, 173 N.C. 432, 435, 92 S.E. 161, 163
(1917).
52
Riggs v. Gish, 201 Iowa 148, 205 N.W. 838 (1925); Nostdal v. Morehart,
132 Minn. 351, 157 N.W. 584 (1916). In Pinkerton v. Crail, 113 Cal. App. 484,
298 Pac. 532 (1931), the court allowed recovery by lessor of $100 for each
orange tree destroyed by lessees drilling operations, as agreed, but it pointed out
that neither of the parties contended that such destruction constituted a breach.
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The Florida Court, in recognizing the distinction between a provision for liquidated damages and a penalty clause, has upheld the
former on several occasions 53 without departing from the general rules
previously discussed. In three recent cases5 4 it has considered the
problem of liquidated damages in real estate contracts, but even now
the exact state of the Florida law is doubtful.
Pembroke v. Caudill,5 5 decided in 1948, involved a contract to
purchase land at a total price of $67,500 and to forfeit, as "liquidated
damages" for failure to perform, $6,200 of earnest money placed in
escrow by the vendee. The vendee stopped payment on his escrowed
check and refused to perform the contract, whereupon the vendor
sought to recover the $6,200 as liquidated damages. The trial court
sustained defendant's demurrer and the Supreme Court affirmed on
the ground that the contract provided for a penalty rather than
liquidated damages. It found the escrowed sum disproportionate to
the actual damages that "should" ensue from breach; but it then
56
enunciated the rule of certainty in the following sweeping language:
"There was nothing in the transaction which could have rendered the damages which might reasonably have been expected
to flow from a breach of the contract uncertain, conjectural or
speculative.
"... the measure of the sellers' damages ordinarily being in
such cases the difference between the agreed purchase price and
the actual value of the property at the time of the breach of the
contract of purchase, less the amount paid."
The usual realty contract prescribes a deposit, to be left with the
53 Lee v. Clearwater Growers Ass'n, 93 Fla. 214, 111 So. 722 (1927); Southern Menhaden Co. v. How, 71 Fla. 128, 70 So. 1000 (1916).
54Pembroke v. Caudill, 160 Fla. 948, 37 So.2d 538 (1948); Medard v. Paulson,
37 So.2d 902 (Fla. 1948); Beatty v. Flannery, 49 So.2d 81 (Fla. 1950).
55160 Fla. 948, 37 So.2d 538 (1948).
561d. at 954, 37 So.2d at 541. This conclusion may have been prompted by
an earlier opinion, which though distinguishable implied that damages to vendor
for breach of a realty contract by vendee were sufficiently ascertainable. Upon
vendee's failure to make deferred payments the vendor sought in equity to
rescind and yet to retain as liquidated damages the payments received. The
Court refused to permit this, especially inasmuch as he had had ample opportunity
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broker by the purchaser. Upon default this sum is forfeited and is
used to cover the broker's commission, with any excess to go to the
seller as liquidated damages. This type of provision has generally
been enforced on the ground that damages for breach of a contract
to purchase realty are not readily asceitainable, 57 although some
jurisdictions have held to the contrary.53 Whether the majority view
is motivated by the concepts prompting equity to grant specific performance of contracts for the sale of realty or by the factor of indeterminability of damages for breach of such contracts is difficult to
discern. In upholding a provision for liquidated damages in such a
contract the Supreme Court of Arkansas said:5 9
"The fluctuations in the market values of land, and the contingencies likely to arise in almost every negotiation concerning real
estate, which might cause or hinder the sale thereof, render the
question of the damages caused by a failure to perform a contract for the exchange of same so indeterminable and uncertain
as to be a proper subject for the parties in advance to liquidate
by contract."
Since land fluctuates in value like other commodities of the market
place, the result of the Pembroke case, standing alone, would make it
virtually impossible to provide in advance for liquidated-damages
clauses in contracts to buy and sell land; obviously any prediction of
future market value, and hence of damages, at the time of drawing up
the contract is at most an educated guess. Therefore, if the guess
proves at the time of breach to have been even slightly erroneous, the
provision for liquidated damages may nevertheless be stricken because
the value of the land is then "certain."
The results of such a rule are obvious. The standards or methods
by which damages are measured can rarely be precisely delineated by
rules of law applicable to all instances. Disagreement frequently
arises as to whether a jury has awarded recompense commensurate
with the injury sustained, and the opinions are replete with vague
to prove them, Taylor v. Rawlins, 90 Fla. 621, 106 So. 424 (1925).
57
Tuten v. Morgan, 160 Ga. 90, 127 S.E. 143 (1925); Shields v. Early, 132
Miss. 282, 95 So. 889 (1928); Dobbs v. Turner, 70 S.W. 458 (Tex. Civ. App.
1902).
5
SBenfield v. Croson, 90 Kan. 661, 136 Pac. 262 (1918) (contract for exchange of realty).
59Westbay v. Terry, 83 Ark. 144, 148, 103 S.W. 160, 161 (1907).
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definitions of speculative or unforeseeable damages. When the bargaining power of the parties is relatively equal there is no reason for
defining "reasonable certainty" in such a manner that a sum agreed
upon in good faith must be termed a penalty -unless the judiciary
is striving to drum up litigation. This is especially true if the sum is
not grossly disproportionate to the actual damages later adjudged.
The parties cannot predict precisely the amount of actual damage that
might ensue, nor should they be expected to do so if prediction is
permitted at all. Indeed, upon entering into the contract the parties
may well have been attempting to protect themselves against a mere
speculative jury determination of damages. If their effort is made in
good faith there is little reason for denying it effect.
The Pembroke opinion, in emphasizing the rules of proportion and
of certainty, recognizes but fails to rest the decision on another important and relevant principle, namely, that stipulation of the same
sum for breach of any one of a number of covenants involving damages of varying amounts, some ascertainable and others not, constitutes imposition of a penalty. 60 The contract provided for deposit in
escrow of a sum regarded variously as partial payment of the total
purchase price, as earnest money for payment of the remainder at the
close of the transaction, and as security for the assumption of two
mortgages at the existing rates of interest and amortization. In two
previous cases involving breach of realty contracts 6' the Florida Court
expressly rested its decision on this principle, which was also recog62
nized in another case not involving the sale of real estate.
The Pembroke case was followed in Medard v. Paulson,6 3 decided
immediately thereafter. The vendee agreed to forfeit to the vendor
$2,500, which was placed in escrow, if he should fail to perform his
covenants within the time specified. He later sought in equity to
rescind the contract and to obtain return of this sum. The chancellor
found that the vendee had committed a breach and could not rescind,
but directed the return of $500; and the Supreme Court affirmed,
thereby confining the vendor in effect to his actual damages and
characterizing the earnest money as a penalty.
In the most recent case of this nature, Beatty v. Flannery,64 the
N-4
See note 44 sapra.
61Metz v. Kennedy Inv. Co., 118 Fla. 708, 160 So. 5 (1935); Smith v. NewelJ,
37 Fla. 147, 20 So. 249 (1896).
62
Greenblatt v. McCall, 67 Fla. 165, 64 So. 748 (1914).
6337 So.2d 902 (Fla. 1948).
6449 So.2d 81 (Fla. 1950).
60
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vendee sued the vendor to recover $3,000 paid both as earnest money
and in part payment on a $30,000 purchase price of realty. The contract provided for forfeiture of this amount as "liquidated damages"
if the vendee should fail to make either of the deferred payments or
to perform his covenants. The Court upheld the forfeiture on the
ground that even in the absence of provision therefor a vendee in
default cannot recover from the vendor money paid in part performance of an executory contract. The Pembroke case was distinguished
as an action by a vendor to obtain from the vendee an amount denominated liquidated damages as distinct from an action by the
vendee to recover a partial payment after defaulting. The following
passage from the Pembroke opinion was quoted: 65
"We have made no attempt to settle certain questions which
may arise under a stipulation similar to the one we have considered, in a case where a deposit of money has actually been
made by the prospective purchaser for the benefit of the owner."
The rule enunciated in the Beatty case is in line with the great
weight of American authority. 66 Although many jurisdictions do not
deny the vendee the right to recover payments already made unless
time is expressly made of the essence of the contract, 67 others make
no mention of this factor as a prerequisite.6 8 In either event a forfeiture clause is not essential, 69 and conversely a provision for retention of payments as liquidated damages does not of itself establish
O6 Pembroke v. Caudill, 160 Fla. 948, 37 So.2d 538, 542 (1948). For some
reason the final paragraph of the opinion, which contains the quoted passage,
does not appear in either the Florida Reports or the Southern Reporter Advance
Sheets; but it does appear in the bound volume of Southern Reporter and is
quoted by the Court in Beatty v. Flannery, 49 So.2d 81, 83 (Fla. 1050).
66
E.g., Glock v. Howard & Wilson Colony Co., 123 Cal. 1, 55 Pac. 713

(1898); Beveridge v. West Side Constr'n Co., 130 App. Div. 139, 114 N.Y. Supp.
521 (1st Dep't 1909); Jennings v. Dexter Horton & Co., 43 Wash. 301, 86 Pac.
576 (1906); Woodman v. Blue Grass Land Co., 125 Wis. 489, 103 N.W. 236
(1905); see Realty Securities Corp. v. Johnson, 93 Fla. 46, 61, 111 So. 532, 537

(1927).
6OlGock v. Howard & Wilson Colony Co., 123 Cal. 1, 55 Pac. 713 (1898);
Jennings v. Dexter Horton & Co., 43 Wash. 301, 86 Pac. 576 (1906); ee Realty
Securities Corp. v. Johnson, 93 Fla. 46, 61, 111 So. 532, 537 (1927).
0 8Downey v. Riggs, 102 Iowa 88, 70 N.W. 1091 (1897); Beveridge v. West
Side Constr'n Co., 130 App. Div. 139, 114 N.Y. Supp. 521 (1st Dep't 1909).
69
Downey v. Riggs, 102 Iowa 88, 70 N.W. 1091 (1897).
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the right to recover. 70

The basis of the rule has been expressed as

follows:71

".... a party to a contract cannot breach it and, being in default,
thereby secure for himself some right or advantage to the detriment of the other party who is not in any default. To permit a
recovery by the party in default would be to allow one who has
breached his contract to recover under that contract despite such
breach, and the innocence of his adversary."
In theory the Beatty decision is contrary to the basic policy underlying denial of recovery of a sum agreed to as liquidated damages
whenever it is a penalty in the eye of the judiciary. Regardless of
whether a plaintiff sues for return of excessive payments or a defendant requests assessment of actual damages, the party in default
is the one alleging that the sum is penal. The court ignores or listens
to his claim neither on its merits nor on the basis of fault, but merely
by noting whether the money has changed hands. Indeed, in one
case 72 the vendee was denied recovery of $2,500 paid on a total purchase price of only $3,740, although the seller did not suffer damages
to that extent. To state this situation is to reveal its inequity.
Explanation of these theoretically contrary results may perhaps
be found in the analogous treatment of illegal contracts. The judiciary
will not aid in their enforcement, but neither will it serve as a conduit
for restitution after partial performance. 73 Depositing money with
an escrow agent is not "execution" of the contract, however; and accordingly the contract is still open to consideration and appropriate
action by the courts.
CONCLUSION

The Pembroke case leads to the conclusion that damages for the
sale of realty will be judicially regarded in Florida as certain rather
7OGlock v. Howard & Wilson Colony Co., 123 Cal. 1, 55 Pac. 713 (1898);
Beveridge v. Westside Constr'n Co., 130 App. Div. 139, 114 N.Y. Supp. 521 (1st
Dep't 1909); Woodman v. Blue Grass Land Co., 125 Wis. 489, 103 N.W. 236
(1905).
71
Ward Real Estate v. Childers, 223 Ky. 302, 304, 3 S.W.2d 601, 602 (1928).
72
jennings v. Dexter Horton & Co., 43 Wash. 301, 86 Pac. 576 (1906).
73 Dixie Rubber Co. v. Catoe, 145 Miss. 342, 110 So. 670 (1926); Finey v.
Stripling, 15 S.W.2d 711 (Tex. Civ. App. 1929); see WILLISTON, CONTRaACTo S7-
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